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0. Introduction 
Stokoe (1960) was the first to argue that American Sign Language (ASL) demon-
strates the kind of abstract structure one expects to find in the analysis of any 
spoken language.
1
 The idea that ASL was not a real language was so deeply 
embedded in the culture, however, that it required nearly two decades for Sto-
koe’s claim to gain acceptance. For Stokoe’s idea to take hold, it was necessary to 
give up the idea that ASL was a poor gestural substitute for real language. Lin-
guists analyzing ASL found morphemes where previously there had been only 
gestures. The transformation from gesture to morpheme was so complete that, in 
the end, no gestures remained. 
The fact that some signs point toward things is undeniable. ASL pronouns, for 
example, point toward physically present referents. The pointing, however, has 
not become part of the analysis of these pointing signs. The field has come to 
accept that even when a referent is physically present, a sign is articulated at an 
area of space associated with the physically present referent. Claiming that signs 
are articulated with respect to locations in space avoids the necessity of claiming 
that signs actually point at things. The analysis is the same for non-present 
referents, where an area of space is also associated with the non-present referent. 
In either case, signs are seen as being directed toward morphemic areas of space.  
Liddell (1995) argues that if the referent is physically present, signs are not 
directed toward areas of space at all, but rather, toward the referent. In addition, I 
analyze areas of space associated with non-present referents as conceptual entities 
rather than morphemes. Furthermore, signs point at such areas of space because of 
the conceptual ability to point. This challenges the notion that signs point because 
the signer is articulating a spatial morpheme. There has been considerable opposi-
tion to the idea that what looks like pointing really is pointing. Part of the reason 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank MJ Bienvenu, Melissa Draganac, Paul Dudis, and Greg Visco for very 
useful discussions of the ASL data and for providing their native speaker intuitions about the use 
of directional verbs. 
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for this is that it gives the appearance of a return to the pre-Stokoe idea that ASL 
was merely a collection of gestures rather than a language. A second reason for 
the opposition rests with assumptions within the field of linguistics itself. Ideas 
about the structure of ASL were being transformed during the seventies and 
eighties. The operating principles during those times held that the meaning of a 
sentence comes from its morphemic parts and their grammatical arrangement. 
Langacker (1991) refers to this as the “building block metaphor.” Since directing 
signs toward things is clearly meaningful, there was no choice but to make 
morphemes responsible for both the meaning and the directionality.  
 
1. Directional Pronouns in ASL 
There is a significant articulatory difference between all sign languages and all 
spoken languages. In producing spoken words, the tongue does not point at things 
in the environment as a speaker produces words. In contrast to this apparently 
universal characteristic of speech, several classes of signs do point at things. That 
is, in order to properly produce many ASL signs, the hands must be directed 
toward real people or things being talked about, if those real people or things are 
present. All known sign languages include such signs. 
During the past thirty years, there have been numerous proposed morphemic 
analyses of directional signs including Woodward (1970), Lacy (1974), Fischer 
(1975), Friedman (1975), Edge and Herrmann (1977), Klima and Bellugi (1979), 
Gee and Kegl (1982), Padden (1988), and Neidle et al. (1995). All such proposals 
are based on the idea that morphemic locations in the space ahead of the signer 
become associated with a referent—whether physically present or not. The 
analyses assume that incorporating a spatial locus into the structure of the verb 
causes the spatial locus to become the point of articulation for the verb. This 
causes the hand as articulator to move toward that locus. 
Liddell (1994, 1995) demonstrates that the assumption upon which these 
analyses are based is false. That is, signs do not move toward a single spatial 
locus. Analyses based on the idea that signs do move this way are inconsistent 
with observable facts about how signs are actually produced. I have argued that 
pronouns and directional verbs either point at physically present referents them-
selves or point at conceptualized-as-present referents. I will not reiterate the 
arguments here, but rather, will take it as given that the types of directional signs 
discussed in this paper actually point at things. Sign types that can be gradiently 
placed or directed for the purpose of pointing include some nouns, almost all 
pronouns, a large set of verbs, numeral quantifiers in general, signs expressing 
locative meanings, and even signs for alphabetic characters. 
Signs can point by the directionality of their movement. The way the hand is 
oriented can also point. For example, in Figure 1 the singular, non-first person 
pronoun PRO has the index finger directed toward and also moves toward the 
addressee. In Figure 1a, PRO is directed horizontally toward the addressee’s chest. 
In Figure 1b, PRO is also directed toward the addressee’s chest, but its form 
differs from the sign in Figure 1a. The reason for this is straightforward. Since the 
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referent is standing in Figure 1b, PRO must be directed upward in order to point 
at his chest. 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
In Figure 2a, the dual first person pronoun makes an in-and-out rocking mo-
tion between the signer and the other person it is directed toward. The motion is 
primarily due to bending the wrist toward and then away from the signer. The in-
and-out motion produces a line whose two ends point at the two referents of the 
pronoun. Motion of the wrist also causes the non-first person dual pronoun in 
Figure 2b to make a sideways back-and-forth movement that also points toward 
the pronoun’s two referents.  
 
Figure 2 
 
 
 
2. Accounting for Directionality 
The signs in Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the general point that ASL pronouns have 
fixed lexical meanings and derive their contextually variable referential values 
from their directionality. The referential values are indicated by the directionality 
of the signs themselves. This fact about ASL is easily accommodated using 
concepts from cognitive grammar (Langacker 1987, 1991) and mental space 
theory (Fauconnier 1985, 1997).  
In cognitive grammar a noun or pronoun profiles a thing in some domain. This 
constitutes the lexically encoded meaning of the noun or pronoun. Figure 3 
contains two representations of the semantic structure of PRO. In Figure 3a, the 
semantic structure includes two entities: the signer, represented as a circle with an 
407
Scott K. Liddell 
‘S’ inside it, and one additional entity. The second entity, represented as a bold 
circle, is the profiled entity in the semantic structure of PRO. This is a diagram-
matic way of representing some entity other than the signer. An abbreviated 
representation of the same semantic structure that only represents the profiled 
entity itself appears in Figure 3b. I will use this type of abbreviated representation 
in subsequent diagrams.  
 
Figure 3 
 
 
Liddell (1995) proposes that one’s conception of the immediate environment 
is a mental space called real space. Real space differs from other mental spaces in 
that the entities within it are conceptualized as existing in the immediate environ-
ment itself. In general, our conceptualizations of immediate reality conform well 
to the actual physical elements we assume are responsible for our perceptions. 
That is, I take in perceptions, and construct real space based on those perceptions. 
If my real space includes a pencil on a desk in front of me, then I have confidence 
that if I extend my hand toward the real space pencil, I will make contact with a 
physical pencil. Instances where real space does not conform to the actual loca-
tions of physical entities help show the distinction between conceptual entities in 
real space and physical things. For example, Figure 4 is a picture of an aquarium. 
The camera was placed so that the corner of the aquarium appears in the center of 
the picture.  
 
Figure 4 
 
 
From this angle there appear to be four fish in the aquarium. In fact, there are 
only three. The two fish labeled ‘Fish #1’ appear both to the left and to the right 
of the corner of the aquarium. For a person perceiving the aquarium from the 
same vantage point as the camera, real space contains four fish, even though the 
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aquarium only contains three. Not only does real space contain four fish, the 
locations of the real space fish do not conform to the locations of the actual 
physical fish. This is obvious since Fish #1 appears to be in two different places. 
It does not even make sense to ask which one is the actual physical fish since 
neither one of the real space fish is in a location corresponding to the location of 
the physical fish. 
In our daily lives, we move around and interact with our environment based 
on real space—our mental space representation of our environment. In general, 
the locations of the conceptual entities in real space correspond well to the 
locations of the physical things we interact with. The correspondence is so good, 
in fact, that we do not distinguish real space from reality. We operate as if real 
space were reality.  
In mental space theory, meaning is constructed by making connections be-
tween entities within mental spaces. Fauconnier (1985, 1997) demonstrates that 
such mappings are a crucial, ongoing, and constant aspect of the use of any 
language. Thus, we would expect that mental space mappings also play a crucial 
role in constructing meaning in ASL. 
The directionality of pronouns and indicating verbs is best understood as pro-
viding mental space mapping instructions. For example, suppose a signer is facing 
her addressee and directs the singular non-first person pronoun PRO toward a 
man to her right and to the left of the addressee. The addressee will recognize the 
sign PRO, which will lead the addressee to include the semantic structure of PRO 
(“one entity other than the signer”) as part of the semantic structure of the utter-
ance. Not only does the addressee recognize her production as an instance of PRO, 
the addressee also sees that PRO’s directionality leads to the man to the left of the 
addressee.  
 
Figure 5 
 
 
Figure 5 represents PRO as part of the semantic structure of the utterance be-
ing produced and also represents the addressee’s real space. The significance of 
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PRO’s directionality is that it provides an instruction to make a mental space 
mapping between the semantic structure of PRO and the entity it is directed 
toward. Since PRO is directed toward the man to the left in the addressee’s real 
space, PRO maps onto that man.  
The directionality of indicating verbs is also best understood as providing 
mental space mapping instructions. In Figure 6a, for example, the sign 
ANALYZE is directed toward the addressee, directly ahead of the signer. In a 
cognitive grammar semantic representation, a verb like ANALYZE contains a 
trajector and a landmark. A trajector is the primary figure within a profiled 
relationship while the landmark is the secondary figure (Langacker 1987, 1991). 
In the active verb ANALYZE, the primary figure is the entity carrying out the 
analysis and the landmark is the entity being analyzed. In general, an indicating 
verb moves toward the entity to be mapped onto its landmark.
2
 Since ANALYZE 
is directed toward the addressee in real space, this prompts a mapping between 
him and the landmark, shown by the connector between the two in Figure 6b. 
 
Figure 6 
 
 
 
For verbs with a plural landmark, the directionality often takes the form of a 
sweeping motion that moves past the multiple entities, thereby indicating the 
extent of the group of entities. For example, Figure 7 illustrates two instances of 
COMPARE
[exhaustive]
.
3
 In Figure 7a, the hands move past a group of videotapes on 
a table in front of the signer. The sweeping movement of the hands indicates the 
entities to map onto the verb’s landmark.  
                                                 
2 There are some exceptional indicating verbs that move away from the entity to be mapped onto 
the landmark. Using a different analytical framework, Padden (1988) refers to them as “backwards 
verbs.” 
3 Klima and Bellugi (1979) treat the sign shown in Figure 7a as a ‘seriated external’ inflection of 
the verb COMPARE. They analyze a vertically downward moving form of the sign as a ‘seriated 
internal’ inflection of COMPARE. In their analysis the difference in meaning between the two 
forms is inflectional. In the analysis I am describing in the text the difference in meaning between 
the two signs illustrated is not an inflectional difference but a referential one, based on the 
directionality of the sign. 
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Another instance of COMPARE
[exhaustive]
 is illustrated in Figure 7b. In this 
case the verb makes a diagonally downward sweeping motion, indicating the 
diagonally arranged set of pictures.  
 
Figure 7 
 
 
 
Figure 7a illustrates the mapping between the semantic structure of the verb 
and the set of videotapes indicated by the horizontal sweep of the hands. The 
mapping is motivated solely by the directional sweeping movement of the hands 
as the verb is produced. Figure 7b shows the mapping that results from directing 
the same verb along a diagonal path past the pictures in Figure 7b. The same 
semantic structure maps onto a distinct set of entities. 
 
3. Mappings beyond the Individual Sign 
Thus far I have restricted the discussion of directionality to individual signs. I 
have attempted to demonstrate that the directionality of both pronouns and 
indicating verbs is best understood as identifying one or more entities to be 
mapped onto the semantic structure of the sign itself. Next I will describe what 
happens when a verb and its pronominal subject both point. 
 
Figure 8 
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Figure 8 illustrates the mapped semantic structure of the clause PRO ASK-
QUESTION YESTERDAY. In this instance, the subject, PRO, is directed toward 
the addressee. The verb ASK-QUESTION begins its movement directed toward 
the addressee then moves in a straight path toward the signer.  
Following Langacker (1999), I treat semantic structures as mental spaces. 
Thus, I am representing the semantic structure of the three-sign clause PRO ASK-
QUESTION YESTERDAY as a mental space with the setting ‘yesterday’. 
Because of the subject-verb relationship between PRO and ASK-QUESTION, the 
semantic structure of the pronoun and the verb’s trajector are linked. The horizon-
tal connector between those two conceptual entities represents this connection.  
Directing the subject pronoun PRO toward the addressee is an instruction to 
map the real space addressee onto the entity profiled in the semantic structure of 
the pronoun. Beginning the verb ASK-QUESTION toward the addressee is an 
instruction to map the addressee onto its trajector. Moving the verb along a path 
toward the signer is an instruction to map the landmark onto the signer. The 
resulting set of mappings involves two mental spaces: the semantic representation 
of the clause and real space. Simply following the mapping instructions from the 
directionality of the individual signs creates a coherent representation of the 
constructed meaning of this utterance. 
This example is typical in that the directionality of a subject pronoun and the 
verb provide mapping instructions that result in the subject pronoun and the 
trajector being mapped onto the same entity—in this case, the addressee in real 
space. This does not always happen, however, as will become apparent later. 
 
4. Making Entities Present through Blending 
In the next example the signer is discussing the number of minutes in college and 
professional basketball games. He begins with the sign BASKETBALL, marked 
as a topic by raising the eyebrows and tilting his head back (Liddell 1980).  
Next he makes college and professional basketball present in the space ahead 
of him by producing the sign COLLEGE to the left of center and #PRO (‘profes-
sional’) to the right of center, as illustrated in the second and third frames of 
Figure 9. The entities ‘college basketball’ and ‘professional basketball’ are quite 
abstract. Nevertheless, mental space blending (Fauconnier and Turner 1996, 
Fauconnier 1997) allows the signer to make those abstract entities present.  
Next he directs one instance of PRO toward the area of space blended with 
professional basketball, which I label |professional basketball|, and directs a 
second instance of PRO toward the area of space labeled |college basketball|. The 
two instances of PRO serve as the dual subject of the side-to-side moving verb 
SAME. This particular instance of SAME moves back and forth between |college 
basketball| and |professional basketball|. 
The directionality of the two pronouns and the verb in this example work just 
like the previous example where the actual referents were physically present. In 
this case, the abstract entities ‘college basketball’ and ‘professional basketball’ 
were made to be present through blending with the space ahead of the signer. 
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Since blending made them present, both of the pronouns and the verb can be 
directed toward them. The mappings associated with the final three signs in 
Figure 9 are illustrated in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 9  “As for basketball, are college and professional games the same (with 
respect to their duration).” 
 
 
 
Figure 10 
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The semantic structure of the first instance of PRO is mapped onto 
|professional basketball| because the sign is directed toward it. The second in-
stance of PRO is directed toward and therefore mapped onto |college basketball|. 
Finally, the two conceptual entities within the semantic structure of SAME are 
mapped onto the two blended entities ahead of the signer, also because the side-
to-side motion of SAME points at both entities.  
The next example is especially interesting because the subject pronoun maps 
onto the addressee but the verb’s trajector does not. The signer is asking the 
addressee why he was staring at the side of her head yesterday.  
 
                                                                                            wh-q 
(1) YESTERDAY PRO LOOK-AT
[durational]
. WHAT’S-UP. 
  “Yesterday you were staring at the side of my head. What was that 
about?” 
 
In (1) PRO points at the physically present addressee. The verb LOOK-
AT
[durational]
 points at two other entities. The fingertips point in the direction of 
looking—the side of the signer’s head—while the back of the hand points at the 
entity doing the looking. But the back of the hand is not directed toward the 
addressee. Instead, the back of the hand is pointing to the right of the signer. The 
directionality of PRO would seem to indicate that the addressee carried out the 
action while the directionality of the verb indicates that an entity to the right of 
the signer carried out the action. 
 
Figure 11 
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In order to understand this example, it is necessary to describe the complex 
conceptualizations that underlie its use. First, the signer is describing an event that 
took place yesterday, represented as the ‘event space’ in the upper right in Figure 
11. The sign LOOK-AT
[durational]
 is being produced in real space, upper left in 
Figure 11. Through mental space blending, she projects aspects of the event space 
onto real space. The signer projects herself from the ‘event space’ onto herself in 
real space. I have labeled the resulting blended entity as the |signer|.
4
 The person 
staring at her is also projected to the right of the |signer| in the blended space. I 
have labeled this entity as the |gazer|.  
Through blending, the signer has recreated the scene in which the current ad-
dressee was staring at the side of her head yesterday. Only part of the scene is 
visible. The addressee can see the |signer| but cannot see the |gazer|. Because of 
the existence of the real space blend, there are two ‘realities’ that signs can be 
directed toward. One is real space and the other is the real space blend. An 
additional characteristic of the blended space adds to the complexity of this 
example. The blended space exists in the same place as real space. A non-signing 
passerby only has access to real space. The addressee, however, not only has 
access to real space, but also understands that aspects of the event that took place 
yesterday are also visible in the blend. Another interesting aspect of the blended 
space is that it has two distinct settings. It inherits its conceptual setting from the 
‘yesterday’ event space. It inherits its physical setting from real space. Thus, it is 
a here-and-now partial recreation of the event that took place yesterday.  
Given the existence of these two overlapping spaces, we can now explore the 
function of the pointing seen in both the subject and the verb. I will begin with the 
verb. During the production of LOOK-AT
[durational]
 the back of the hand indicates 
that the |gazer| was doing the looking. The directionality of the fingertips indicates 
that the looking was directed toward the side of the head of the |signer|. If we 
make the assumption that the subject of the verb identifies the entity doing the 
looking, then the pointing of the subject pronoun PRO indicates that the current 
addressee was the one doing the looking. The result is a conceptually coherent set 
of mappings. The verb’s directionality identifies the two participants in the real 
space blend. The verb’s directionality does not, however, provide the identity of 
the |gazer|. The identity of the |gazer| only becomes apparent by directing the 
subject PRO toward the real space addressee.  
 
5. Implications for Meaning Construction 
Currently, meaning construction is conceived of as taking place at a level distinct 
from language structure: 
 
                                                 
4  The signer only partially becomes herself yesterday. That is, it is primarily her head that 
represents herself yesterday. The signer is still using her right hand in real space to narrate. 
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Meaning construction takes place at a “cognitive” level, call it level C; this level is dis-
tinct from the language structure (i.e. it is not an “underlying form,” it is not a “represen-
tation” of language or of language meaning, it is not objectively associated with any par-
ticular set of linguistic expressions). (Fauconnier 1997:36) 
 
I have not been treating meaning construction as something that takes place at 
a level distinct from language structure here since the directional ASL signs 
appear to require mappings between their individual semantic structures and other 
mental space entities. Although it might be possible that sign languages and 
vocally produced languages operate differently with respect to meaning construc-
tion, it could also be possible that constructing meaning by mapping semantically 
encoded meaning onto other mental space elements can adequately account for 
meaning construction in both signed languages and vocally produced languages.  
It is not possible to provide a thorough account here of how this approach to 
meaning construction can account for the wide array of data for which mental 
space theory has already demonstrated revealing solutions. However, below I will 
describe how this approach can account for the role-value distinction. I will then 
suggest an approach to metonymy, which also differs from the current mental 
space approach to metonymy. 
I will use the sentence Bob’s neighbor bought an island to illustrate the dis-
tinction between roles and values. 
 
Figure 12 
 
 
 
Figure 12a contains a mental space structured according the proposals in Fau-
connier (1997). Entities r1 and r2 represent the two roles ‘Bob’s neighbor’ and ‘an 
island’. Assuming that the addressee knows that the speaker is talking about his 
neighbor George, entity r1 is mapped onto entity a (George). Entity r2 is un-
mapped and remains a role, unmapped onto a specific value.  
In Figure 12b Bob’s neighbor maps onto the entity George in the addressee’s 
encyclopedic knowledge. Since there is no metonymy in this example, the trajec-
tor likewise maps onto George. However, the addressee does not know which 
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island is being talked about. In this circumstance, the semantic structure of an 
island remains unmapped.  
A comparison of the two diagrams shows that the role r1 in Figure 12a corre-
sponds to the semantic structure of Bob’s neighbor in Figure 12b. Similarly, r2 
corresponds to the semantic structure of an island. A conceptual role is an entity 
with a specific semantic property. That is, the role ‘an island’ is a conceptual 
entity with the property ‘island’. This is exactly how one would describe the 
semantic structure of the noun phrase an island. As a result, the semantic poles of 
the subject and object noun phrases above could be described as expressing roles. 
Since Bob’s neighbor maps onto George, the subject NP has a value reading. 
Thus, without the need to propose role-type entities, semantic representations 
automatically provide roles. When mapped onto other mental space entities, they 
express value readings.  
Metonymy describes the use of language where a speaker mentions one thing 
in order talk about another. Fauconnier (1985) proposes a solution to metonymy 
in which, given the appropriate pragmatic circumstances, mentioning one entity a 
can lead directly to a related entity b. Both a and b are mental space elements 
linked by a connector. Element a is called the trigger and element b is called the 
target. The ambiguous example In that picture, the girl with green eyes has blue 
eyes can be understood to mean that the image has green eyes while the model has 
blue eyes, or vice versa.
5
  
 
Figure 13 
 
 
 
The mapping shown in Figure 13a illustrates the constructed meaning in 
which the image of the girl has green eyes while the model has blue eyes. Entity 
w maps onto the image of the girl (the trigger), which does have green eyes. The 
image maps onto the model (the target), who has blue eyes.  
If semantic spaces of the type proposed by Langacker (1987, 1991) are used 
for meaning construction, an alternative suggests itself. The directionality of ASL 
                                                 
5 This example is similar to an example from Fauconnier (1985).  
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pronouns and verbs has already demonstrated that overt subjects and trajectors 
can be independently mapped in the process of meaning construction. In meton-
ymy a person mentions one thing in order to talk about another. The solution 
proposed here is a direct representation of that description of metonymy. The 
subject the girl with green eyes maps in a straightforward way onto the image of a 
girl with green eyes. If the semantic structure and the mapping of an overt subject 
is taken as a guide in determining the mapping of the trajector, then the addressee 
is free to conclude that the entity with blue eyes is, in fact, the model. This allows 
a mapping between the trajector and the girl with blue eyes. Subjects and trajec-
tors will typically map onto the same entity, but not in the case of metonymy, 
where the speaker mentions one thing in order to talk about another.  
 
6. Conclusion 
The directionality of pronouns and verbs in ASL provides mapping instructions 
for their semantic structures. This leads to a type of meaning construction in 
which the mental spaces that serve as the basis for meaning construction are 
semantic structures. If such mappings are generalized to other instances of lan-
guage use, both spoken and signed, it appears that the benefits of mental space 
mappings are maintained. Semantic structures are an indispensable component of 
the chain linking phonetics to comprehension. The data discussed in this paper 
suggest that meaning can be satisfactorily constructed if built around these 
obligatory representations. 
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